Trust¶
Deep hub — not the product front door. Prefer why-occam · tools/index · trust-and-safety. This page links integrity surfaces; runtime
tools/listand verified tool cards win on schemas.
Hub for integrity and proof surfaces. This page links deep docs; it does not duplicate their contracts.
| Topic | Deep page |
|---|---|
| Receipts | receipts.md |
| Verify modes | receipt_verification.md |
| Canary protocol | adr/0010-proof-of-read-canary.md, PROBE_PROTOCOL.md |
| Honest failures | trust/honest-failures.md |
| Installation safety | trust/installation-safety.md |
| Datasets | datasets.md |
| Capability inventory | CAPABILITIES.md |
Proof-of-read canary¶
HMAC-SHA256 sentinel bound to (sessionId, time bucket)
(Canary/CanarySecret.cs:100–110). Issuance is audited
(CanaryService.cs:113+, CanaryIssueLog.cs). Verification is a fixed
precedence state machine (CanaryVerifier.cs:50+).
| Wire verdict | Meaning |
|---|---|
READ_VERIFIED |
Authentic, issued, fresh window |
READ_STALE |
Authentic, issued, older bucket |
HALLUCINATED |
No match in recognised window |
REPLAY_SUSPECT |
Authentic crypto, never issued by this host |
Source: Canary/CanaryModels.cs:8–49.
Surface: CLI occam canary + probe HTTP host and MCP tools
occam_canary_issue / occam_canary_verify (reader + full profiles;
Tools/OccamCanaryIssueTool.cs, CanaryCliVerbs.cs, CanaryProbeServerHost.cs).
Registered in OccamToolNames.
Env: OCCAM_CANARY_* — see configuration.md.
Receipts + Merkle¶
- Sign: ECDSA P-256 (
Receipts/ReceiptSigner.cs:13) - Policy: on by default;
OCCAM_RECEIPTS=off|0|falsedisables (ReceiptsPolicy.cs:12) - Blocks: ordered SHA-256 Merkle (
MerkleTree.cs:13) - Capsule: optional
occam://capsule/…(CapsuleCodec.cs) - Optional RFC3161 time anchor:
OCCAM_TIME_ANCHOR+OCCAM_TSA_URL(TimeAnchorService.cs) — opt-in
A valid signature proves integrity relative to a key. It does not prove semantic truth or authentic origin of the website.
MCP trust tools¶
| Tool | Role | Code |
|---|---|---|
occam_verify |
offline / live / prove / citation / history | Tools/OccamVerifyTool.cs:25–35 |
occam_canary_issue |
Mint canary URL + session (no sentinel) | Tools/OccamCanaryIssueTool.cs |
occam_canary_verify |
Adjudicate claimed sentinel → verdict | Tools/OccamCanaryVerifyTool.cs |
occam_claim_check |
Relevant blocks + Merkle citation; you judge support | Claims/ClaimCheckService.cs:25, tool :18 |
occam_attest |
Fail-closed status (supported / …); Merkle ≠ support |
Attest/AttestService.cs, tool :22 |
occam_dataset_export |
Per-row receipts + manifest Merkle root | Dataset/DatasetExportService.cs:25, tool :21 |
Tool pages: occam_verify · occam_canary_issue · occam_canary_verify · occam_claim_check · occam_attest · occam_dataset_export.
Handoff checklist¶
- Extract with receipts on (default).
- Persist
receipt(andcontentHash/ leaves as needed). - Later:
occam_verifyoffline or live;prove/citationfor block membership. - For claims in a report:
occam_attest— gate onstatus, not BM25 alone. - For an auditable URL set:
occam_dataset_exportthen per-row / manifest verify. - For agent-read proofs:
occam_canary_issue→ fetch →occam_canary_verify(or CLIoccam canary).
Related¶
- CASCADE — how a read is acquired before a receipt is attached
- CAPABILITIES — status of each trust feature
- Handbook: 14 what a receipt proves, 15 verifying, 16 evidence for claims