Skip to content

Networking and proxies

Make network behavior discoverable. This page is intentionally honest about where proxy and SSRF controls apply — and where they do not.

Status: LIMITED (path-scoped)

Proxy support

Area Proxy? Notes
HTTP extract worker Yes (env / egress helpers) Respects configured HTTP(S) proxy settings used by the worker egress path
Browser extract Partial Browser traffic follows Playwright/browser proxy configuration when set; not identical to every HTTP helper
CSS / schema extract Check worker path Shares network-safety helpers on the hardened path; do not assume every Core HttpClient uses the same knobs
Managed providers Provider-dependent Third-party egress; Occam’s local proxy rotation is not “fingerprint rotation”
Search / translation / TSA Separate clients May not share the extract-worker proxy policy

Proxy rotation ≠ browser fingerprint rotation. Rotating egress IPs does not change TLS/JA3 fingerprints or solve anti-bot systems.

Proxy rotation (operator)

Some installs configure a list of proxies with rotation for HTTP egress. Rotation is incomplete for every daemon/browser path — do not assume the browser worker, CSS path, or managed provider share the same rotator. Prefer verifying the path you use against Configuration. Empty proxy-file configurations can suppress an inline list (operator footgun).

On browser extracts, Occam may silently dismiss common cookie-consent overlays. This is not anti-bot bypass and not configurable as a first-class MCP feature. Treat it as automatic behavior that can change which DOM is visible — see handbook automatic-behaviors chapter.

SSRF / private IP

  • HTTP acquisition resolves both address families, rejects private / link-local answers, and pins the socket to validated addresses. Browser acquisition validates the initial host and every HTTP(S) request host before Chromium continues it, but Chromium performs its own DNS resolution, so the browser path cannot socket-pin the checked address. This narrows DNS-rebinding exposure; it is not the same guarantee as the HTTP path.
  • CSS extract was brought to parity for private-IP rejection and response body caps.
  • Some auxiliary Core HTTP clients and managed/search paths do not share one universal guard — do not claim “every outbound call is SSRF-safe identically.”

What to configure

See Configuration for OCCAM_HTTP_PROXY / OCCAM_HTTPS_PROXY and related egress variables. Prefer documenting the variable you set against the path you use (HTTP read vs browser vs managed).